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ABSTRACT
If people are not in control of the collection and sharing
of their personal health information collected using mobile
health (mHealth) devices and applications, privacy concerns
could limit their willingness to use and reduce potential
benefits provided via mHealth. We investigated users’ will-
ingness to share their personal information, collected using
mHealth sensing devices, with their family, friends, third
parties, and the public. Previous work employed hypotheti-
cal scenarios, surveys and interviews to understand people’s
information-sharing behavior; to the best of our knowledge,
ours is the first privacy study where participants actually
have the option to share their own information with real
people. We expect our results can guide the development
of privacy controls for mobile devices and applications that
collect any personal and activity information, not restricted
to health or fitness information.
Our study revealed three interesting findings about peo-
ple’s privacy concerns regarding their sensed health infor-
mation: 1) We found that people share certain health in-
formation less with friends and family than with strangers,
but more with specific third parties than the public. 2) In-
formation that people were less willing to share could be
information that is indirectly collected by the mobile de-
vices. 3) We confirmed that privacy concerns are not static;
mHealth device users may change their sharing decisions
over time. Based on our findings, we emphasize the need for
sensible default settings and flexible privacy controls to allow
people to choose different settings for different recipients,
and to change their sharing settings at any time.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
J.3 [Life and Medical Sciences]: Health—mobile; J.4
[Social and Behavioral Sciences]: Sociology
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1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile health (mHealth) technologies, including health
text messaging, mobile phone apps, remote monitoring and
portable sensor devices, have grown rapidly in the past five
years and are expected to play an important role in improv-
ing access to health information, resources and clinical care.
mHealth devices can be used to monitor activities (Fitbit [8]),
sleep (Wakemate [26]), emotions (Affectiva [1]), vital signs
like blood pressure (Withings blood pressure cuff [28]) or
fetal conditions (Monica AN24 [17]). Users can collect their
personal health, physical and social activity information and
upload it to a vendor website, social networking website, a
personal health record (Microsoft HealthVault [11] or, for-
merly, Google Health [10]), or a health-provider-operated
electronic health record. Once the data is uploaded, users
can share the information with health providers who help
diagnose their illness or monitor their treatment. Family and
friends can motivate them as they work towards a healthier
lifestyle. People can also share their experiences with their
peers (e.g., others suffering from similar medical conditions)
and provide support while in recovery [9]. New mHealth
technologies might also enable users to share health informa-
tion with pharmacists, insurance companies, drug companies,
employers, or others involved in their healthcare.
However, if users are not comfortable with the way their
information is being collected or shared, they may not use
mHealth technologies at all, or use them in limited ways,
thereby reducing the potential for mHealth technologies to
improve health and healthcare. In addition, users’ preferences
for collecting and sharing information are likely to vary
depending on the types of information and the types of
recipients. For example, studies of mobile location tracking
applications show that at least some users vary in their
willingness to share depending on place and context [2],
or by recipient [6]. We set out to identify concerns about
privacy raised by mHealth technologies, and how a sample
of new mHealth device users share (or not) their personal
information with different types of recipients.
Prior work, including our own [21] (see Appendix), has
studied users’ sharing behavior through focus groups, surveys
and interviews; in these cases, study participants either were
given hypothetical scenarios about health data management,
had a brief opportunity to use a health device, or were
assumed to have experience with collecting and sharing health
information. It has been discovered that people’s stated
privacy preferences and concerns may differ from their actual
sharing behaviors [5, 13]; thus, findings of privacy concerns
from the prior work might not reflect the actual concerns
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people have when they use a real mHealth device to share
data with real people.
To study how new mHealth users share different types of
personal information with different recipients over time, we
conducted a user study with n=41 participants. To the best
of our knowledge, ours is the first study that explores users’
privacy concerns by requiring them to actually share the
information collected about them using mHealth devices; our
subjects could decide whether to share the information and
if so, how much information to share with others. The device
we used for our study is one of the most popular devices, a
fitness device called Fitbit. None of the participants in the
user study had ever used a Fitbit prior to the study. At least
ten participants had previously used a pedometer but had
never uploaded its data to a website or online application.
A majority of the focus group participants considered fit-
ness information to be less sensitive when compared to other
types of health information; people might be more concerned
about sharing health information like pregnancy status, on-
set of stress and HIV status, than fitness information like
the number of steps they took and calories burned. We
nonetheless expect our findings to shed light on the case of
mobile devices and applications that collect any personal
and activity information, not restricted to health or fitness
information.
In this paper, we answer the following questions:
• Did participants share different types of personal or sensed
information more or less frequently?
• Do participants’ decisions about sharing health information
differ across types of sharing partners (family members,
friends, third parties, and the public)?
• Does sharing behavior change over time; are participants’
privacy preferences dynamic?
We confirmed that people’s sharing behavior depends on
the type of information being shared and the sharing recipient.
Our results showed that participants were generally less
willing to share personal demographic information or context
information collected by the mHealth device, than about
sharing the health information that the device is meant to
collect. Our results also showed something surprising – study
participants were more willing to share some information
with strangers than with their own family and friends; among
strangers, they were more willing to share some information
with specific third parties than with “the public” at large.
We also confirmed that people’s privacy behavior is dynamic;
participants’ sharing behavior changed during the course of
our study. It is important to understand people’s willingness
to share, so that mHealth devices can provide patients with
the controls to share their information in a manner such that
they can enjoy the benefits provided by the device without
disclosing more information than is necessary.
In this paper, we use the term“user” to denote the mHealth
device user and “sharing partner” to denote the person(s)
with whom the user shares her fitness information.
2. METHODS
We conducted a social experiment to examine users’ deci-
sions to share particular types of information with various
types of information recipients (and requesters) over a 5-day
period. During the study, users were asked to carry a Fit-
bit [8], a popular mHealth device that uses an accelerometer
to estimate a user’s calories burned, steps taken, distance
Male Female Total
Students 8 13 21
Working 5 7 12
Retired 0 8 8
Total 13 28 41
Table 1: Participants
traveled, and sleep quality. During the five days of the study,
each subject was asked to wear the Fitbit at all times, except
when swimming, bathing or any time they felt uncomfort-
able wearing it. They were asked to upload the collected
data at least daily to fitbit.com. Unfortunately, fitbit.com
only provided users with limited coarse-grained data sharing
options, and no mechanism for monitoring sharing behaviors.
So, we developed a custom web interface that displayed both
uploaded Fitbit data and personal traits and allowed users
to share data with others. Participants used this interface
(instead of fitbit.com) to view their data and make sharing
decisions, throughout the study.
The goal of the user study was to understand people’s
willingness to share their personal health/fitness information
with family, friends, third parties and the public. Previous
work has shown that young and old people have different
views about sharing health information [4, 7, 12]. So, we
recruited a sample of college students, working adults, and
retirees for the user study. We recruited 21 undergraduate
students, 12 adult workers from the local area including
Dartmouth employees, and 8 female elderly residents of a
local retirement home, as shown in Table 1. It was not
an aim of the study to understand the influence of gender
and occupation on privacy concerns, so we did not focus
on the distribution of participants among these categories.
The recruitment flyer presented the study as a study of a
new device to help individuals trying to lose weight and/or
improve fitness and health. To avoid self-selection bias, the
participants were not told that the study was about privacy.
Subjects were required to own a computer, to be injury-free,
to be able to walk and carry the device with them during
the five days. Study participants were paid for their time.
We did not retain any sensitive information, like the partic-
ipants’ fitness information collected using the Fitbits, after
the study; we stored only the sharing settings that they
chose. Study participants were debriefed after the study to
make them aware of the deception used in the study and to
inform them that the goal of the study was to understand
their privacy concerns and not just to collect their activity
data, and that we shared their data only with the people
they chose as their sharing partners. This study, including
our use of deception and subsequent debriefing procedure,
was approved by Dartmouth’s Institutional Review Board.
To study participants’ willingness to share secondary in-
formation, apart from the primary sensed information, we
also collected other related personal information about each
participant, including his or her age, gender, height, weight,
health goals, overall activity level and academic major. Hence-
forth, we refer to these seven characteristics as “traits”.
To understand how participants share information with
real people, we asked them to select family members and
friends to receive their shared information. Throughout the
study, participants also received requests to share data with
specific third parties. These specific third parties represent
118
academic researchers, medical labs, private companies, and
the government. The third parties were real, but the requests
were fake. (For example, one of the email requests was
from a fictitious group of students at Harvard University,
requesting activity data for use in a machine-learning class.)
Each participant also had a “public profile” available on the
website with their Fitbit data; we told the participants that
this profile was visible to anyone who had the url (unless
they changed the setting, as described below).
The website provided opt-out sharing settings; by default,
all the collected information was shared in the finest de-
tail unless participants changed the settings to “opt-out” of
sharing. We used an opt-out policy (instead of opt-in) to
be consistent with the majority of online applications now
available in which the default privacy setting is to share,
with the option to “opt-out” of sharing. We understand,
though, that people’s sharing decisions are influenced by
default settings [24]. Although we agree that opt-in settings
give more control to the user, for our study we used opt-out
to provoke action (visit website and change settings) that we
could observe among those with privacy preferences.
We wanted to study people’s willingness to share their
information, and not how they adapted to the device and
controls on the website. So, the study was divided into two
phases; a learning phase in which participants were given two
days to get used to the device and website, and the study
phase, in which we observed participants’ sharing settings
during days 3-5 of the study.
The learning phase — day 1 and day 2. The re-
searchers met with participants, individually, on both days
to answer any questions they had about using the device and
the website. On the first day of the study, participants were
asked to select at least one family member and two friends
with whom to share their information. An email was sent to
these sharing partners, informing them about the study and
asking them to be a part of the study.
On the second day, we told the participants that their in-
formation would be shared with their family and friends from
the next day onwards and that they could decide, by using
the controls on the website, whether and what they wanted
to share with their family members and friends. We also
informed participants that over the next few days they might
get requests from third parties to share their information
but that they could use the controls on the website to limit
sharing of their information; they were required to visit the
website for each third-party request so that we could observe
their sharing choices. Similarly we informed them that their
data on the website would be open to the public but they
could use controls to opt-out of sharing. We did not tell the
participants that the third-party requests were fake or that
their information was not actually exposed to the public.
The sharing phase — day 3 to day 5. On the third
day of the study, an email was sent to the family members
and friends with a link to a webpage where they could see the
participant’s shared Fitbit information and traits. Through-
out the study, participants could change the sharing settings
for each type of information and for each sharing partner.
The Fitbit-collected activity data (i.e., steps, calories and
sleep) could be shared in 5-minute, hourly, 6-hourly, or daily
summaries, or it could be not shared at all. By default, activ-
ity data was shared at the maximum setting, i.e., 5-minute
granularity. Participants were also able to share or hide their
personal traits (age, height, weight, gender, activity level,
health goals, academic major), independently by type and
for each sharing partner. Participants also received emails
everyday during the five-day period of the study, containing
status information. From the third day of the study onwards,
these mails explained who was receiving their information
and what sharing settings they had chosen for each infor-
mation type for each sharing partner. The message also
contained a link to the site where they could change these
settings at any time.
The web interface showed different views of the same in-
formation. The default view, shown in Figure 1(a), was the
participant’s view. The interface also had views correspond-
ing to each sharing partner; see Figure 1(b). On these views,
the participant could decide what information she wanted to
share with her sharing partner, make changes with the click
of a button and observe exactly what her sharing partner will
be able to see; the goal of our website design was to reduce
the disconnect between sharing controls and the information
being shared.
The emails from third parties, requesting to access partici-
pant information from the website, including all information
and their email addresses, were sent by us as if from 6 differ-
ent organizations/groups. Each third-party email explained
who the group was and why they wanted the data. The
groups identified were: college students, a research lab, a
government agency, an engineering company, a wellness in-
stitute and a pharmaceutical company. Here we do not
examine differences in willingness to share between these
different types of third parties. Instead we analyze sharing
behavior with all third parties as a category to compare
to other sharing partner categories (family, friends, public).
We told the participants that the data on the website to be
shared with third parties was not anonymous (email address
was shared), but that their email address would be used by
the third parties only if the researchers needed to contact
them. The email address was, however, not visible on their
public profile and hence not shared with the “public”. The
order of third-party email requests was randomized, and the
number of requests varied across the days (three on the third
day, one on the fourth and two on the last day). We did not
actually share the participants’ data with any third-party
organizations, but crafted the messages to be as believable
as possible.
We monitored participants’ website activity through logs,
that recorded when they logged in, when they looked at their
own data view or the views of their various sharing partners
and when they changed the sharing settings. To understand
reasons behind participants’ sharing behavior, we conducted
post-study interviews in which we asked the participants
several questions: whether they ever took off the device to
hide any information, whether they ever changed the sharing
settings and why, and whether they fell for our deception
(that the study was really about privacy-related behavior,
and that no data was actually shared with the public or
with third parties). After the interviews, we revealed the
deception and explained to them that the goal of the study
was not to collect their fitness information, but to observe
their sharing behavior. We recorded the interviews,then
transcribed and coded them manually.
2.1 Analytic methods
We conducted quantitative analysis of the website logs to
understand the participants’ sharing settings and a qualita-
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(a) Own view (b) Sharing partner’s view (Mom’s view)
Figure 1: Screenshots of views on the study website
tive analysis of the post-study interviews to give us insight
into the reasons for their sharing behavior. We use the
analysis to answer the questions listed earlier.
2.2 Measuring sharing behavior.
To measure participants’ willingness to share their informa-
tion with a group of sharing partners, we defined a sharing
score for each participant. The sharing score was computed
as follows:
s(u, p, t, d) is the setting chosen by user (u) on day (d)
when sharing information type (t) with sharing partner (p).
For steps, calories and sleep, the setting can be 0, 1, 2, 3 or
4, which corresponds to the five possible settings: hide, share
daily summary, share 6-hourly summary, share hourly sum-
mary, and share 5-minute detail respectively. For the other
information types, the setting can be either 0 (hide infor-
mation) or 1 (share information). By default, s(u, p, t, d)=4
for t={steps, calories, sleep} and s(u, p, t, d)=1 for t={age,
gender, health goals, height, activity level, academic major,
weight}. That is, the default setting is the maximum sharing
setting. We normalize each score by dividing by max(t).
max(t) =
{
4 ∀t ∈ (steps,calories,sleep)
1 otherwise
(1)
To represent the amount of information shared with a cat-
egory of sharing partners (i.e., family, friends, third parties,
public), we computed an overall sharing score for that cat-
egory, labeled as “group sharing score”. Equation 2 defines
the group sharing score for participant (u) on day (d) as the
mean of all sharing scores for type (t) for each member of
the sharing partner group (g). For example, if a participant
identified two friends then the friend group sharing score for
weight would be the mean of the sharing scores for weight
for the two friends.





s(u, p, t, d) (2)
To measure how personal traits were shared, we also com-
puted a combined sharing score for traits, which is the average
of the sharing scores of all the personal traits, labeled traits.
We focus most of our analysis on two snapshots: the
initial sharing score, grpscore(u, g, t, 2) for the last set-
ting on day 2 for each type t, and the final sharing score,
grpscore(u, g, t, 5). We normalize each score by dividing
by max(t), on day 5. Unless mentioned otherwise, we used
t-tests to compute the difference between normalized shar-
ing scores, to understand how different information types
were shared with the different groups; paired sample t-tests
were used to compare different behaviors of a single subject,
whereas independent sample t-tests were used to compare one
subject to another. We used analysis of variance (ANOVA)
post-hoc testing using Bonferroni’s method to compare the
sharing behavior of students, employees and retirees; whereas
the t-test is used to compare the means between two groups,
ANOVA is a statistical procedure used to compare means
between three or more groups.
3. RESULTS
We present below the results from the quantitative and
qualitative analysis. We highlight only some of the important
results in this paper; full results are available in the technical
report [20].
3.1 Information sharing analysis
27 of the 41 participants identified both a family member
and friends with whom to share information. Among the 27
participants, the mean number (and standard deviation) of
family members and friends that the participants chose were
1.26 (0.44) and 2.11 (0.5) respectively. Two participants did
not identify a family member, but did identify friends, while
11 participants did not select any friends or family members
(the reasons given by these respondents included privacy
concerns, not wanting to bother them, and expectation of lack
of interest, as discussed in Section 3.2). These 11 participants,
however, were not considered when we computed sharing
scores for friends and family. Similarly, when comparing
sharing scores between family and public, we used the scores
of all participants who selected at least one family member.
Did participants share different types of personal or
sensed information more or less frequently? Table 2
shows the final normalized sharing scores for family used to
evaluate within-subject differences in sharing different types
of information.
Table 2 shows that with family members, the study partici-
pants shared weight and health goals less than age, academic
major, activity level and the sensed information (steps). It is
not surprising that participants were willing to share obvious
information known to their family members such as age and
gender, but at least some participants seemed to consider
information like weight and health goals as more private. In
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Table 2: Mean and (standard deviation) of final nor-












† Sharing score for sensed information (steps, calories and sleep)
is significantly higher than for weight and goals, sharing score
for weight is significantly less than the score for most personal
traits (age, gender, academic major, height and activity level)
and sharing score for goals is significantly less than the score
for age, p ≤ 0.1
the post-study interviews, some participants were reluctant
to share this information because they worried that family
members might judge them and even reprimand them. A
web interface might influence sharing behavior, but in the
web interface we built, however, sensed information was more
prominent than personal traits, so the sensitivity of weight
and health goals had nothing to do with the interface layout.
Do participants’ decisions about sharing health in-
formation differ across types of sharing partners (fam-
ily members, friends, third parties, and the public)?
Table 3 shows the normalized final group sharing scores for
sensed information (steps, calories, sleep), traits (the com-
bined score), weight, goals and academic major across three
comparison categories: family vs friends, family vs public,
public vs third parties. Recall that a score of 1 implies that
the information has been shared to its maximum with all the
sharing recipients in that group.
More information shared with family than friends.
Subjects shared weight with family significantly more of-
ten than with friends. The sharing scores for friends were
marginally less than that for family members for all other
information types as well, but the differences are not sta-
tistically significant. From the interviews, we learned that
some participants were more concerned about sharing their
information with their friends because they were worried
of being judged by their friends more than by their family,
especially in the case of students, since they see their friends
everyday.
More information shared with family than public.
Table 3 shows that participants shared more information
about their steps, calories and sleep with family than with
the public. Participants said that they felt uncomfortable
sharing sensed information with strangers because it made
them feel like they were “being watched”. Not surprisingly,
participants also shared personal traits significantly more
with family than with public.
Less information shared with public than with third
parties. Table 3 shows that participants were generally more
open to sharing weight and health goals with specific third
Table 3: Final normalized sharing scores for fam-
ily vs friends, family vs public, and public vs third
parties (TP)
Family vs Friends Family vs Public Public vs TP
Family Friends Family Public Public TP
Steps
0.96 0.94 0.96 0.91∗ 0.89 0.89
(0.19) (0.14) (0.19) (0.22) (0.27) (0.25)
Calories
0.96 0.94 0.96 0.89∗ 0.89 0.89
(0.19) (0.17) (0.19) (0.25) (0.27) (0.25)
Sleep
0.96 0.95 0.96 0.87∗ 0.87 0.87
(0.19) (0.14) (0.19) (0.30) (0.30) (0.29)
Traits
0.91 0.83 0.91 0.78∗ 0.80 0.83
(0.23) (0.26) (0.23) (0.29) (0.29) (0.32)
Goals
0.85 0.73 0.86 0.61∗ 0.68 0.82∗
(0.36) (0.42) (0.36) (0.50) (0.48) (0.38)
Major
0.94 0.91 0.95 1.00 0.98 0.82∗
(0.21) (0.25) (0.21) (0.00) (0.16) (0.38)
Weight
0.83 0.64∗ 0.84 0.54∗∗ 0.59 0.74∗
(0.37) (0.46) (0.36) (0.51) (0.50) (0.43)
n=27 n=28 n=37
† Final scores for the two groups are different, p ≤ 0.1
∗ Final scores for the two groups are different, p ≤ 0.05
∗∗ Final scores for the two groups are different, p ≤ 0.01
parties than with the public. In the post-study interviews,
some participants said this was because they perceived some
benefit in sharing information with specific third parties.
Third-party request emails contained a reason for wanting
the participants’ data and at least some participants appar-
ently expected the third parties to use their data for the
purposes mentioned in the email. In contrast, some partici-
pants expressed concern about who among the public would
be accessing their information or how they might use it.
Surprisingly, participants were less willing to share aca-
demic major with the specific third parties than with the
public. Some participants said during the post-study inter-
view that they shared information with specific third parties
because they thought that the information would be useful,
based on the purpose stated in the third-party request. Some
of them felt that academic major was not relevant to the
request.
Given the comparison on personal traits, we were surprised
to see no difference in sharing of sensed information between
public and third parties.
Does sharing behavior change over time; are par-
ticipants’ privacy preferences dynamic? In Table 4, we
show select traits and sensed information by the initial (end
of day 2) and final (end of day 5) sharing scores for three
sets of sharing partners: family, friends and public.
Sharing sensed information. For family, participants
did not change sharing behavior of sensed information over
the course of the study, while for friends, there was a slight
(non-significant) change. For the public, however, we found
that there was a statistically significant reduction in sharing
scores for steps and sleep. Some participants felt uncomfort-
able sharing their steps and sleep, as the study progressed;
they said that they felt like they were being watched.
Sharing traits. Similarly, in the case of the trait informa-
tion, there was a slight (non-significant) reduction in sharing
scores for family. However, there was a statistically signifi-
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Table 4: Initial and final normalized sharing scores
for family, friends and public
Family Friends Public
Initial Final Initial Final Initial Final
Steps
0.96 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.94 0.88∗
(0.19) (0.19) (0.10) (0.14) (0.22) (0.26)
Calories
0.96 0.96 1.00 0.95 0.93 0.88
(0.19) (0.19) (0.02) (0.17) (0.23) (0.27)
Sleep
0.96 0.96 0.98 0.95 0.93 0.87†
(0.19) (0.19) (0.09) (0.16) (0.22) (0.30)
Traits
0.95 0.91 0.93 0.84∗ 0.92 0.80∗∗
(0.19) (0.23) (0.13) (0.26) (0.17) (0.29)
Activity
0.96 0.93 0.95 0.84† 0.98 0.85∗
(0.19) (0.26) (0.20) (0.36) (0.16) (0.36)
Goals
0.93 0.86 0.88 0.75∗ 0.83 0.68∗
(0.26) (0.36) (0.29) (0.41) (0.38) (0.47)
Weight
0.89 0.84 0.80 0.63∗∗ 0.83 0.61∗∗
(0.31) (0.36) (0.35) (0.46) (0.38) (0.49)
n=28 n=29 n=41
† Initial and final scores are different, p ≤ 0.1
∗ Initial and final scores are different, p ≤ 0.05
∗∗ Initial and final scores are different, p ≤ 0.01
Table 5: Final normalized sharing scores based on
gender
Female Male
grpscore(u, Friends, Traits, 5) 0.78 0.95 †
grpscore(u, Friends, Weight, 5) 0.47 0.95 ∗∗
grpscore(u, Friends, Goals, 5) 0.64 0.95 ∗
† Sharing scores of females and males are different, p ≤ 0.1
∗ Sharing scores of females and males are different, p ≤ 0.05
∗∗ Sharing scores of females and males are different, p ≤ 0.01
cant difference between the initial and final sharing scores for
friends and for the public. We learned from the post-study
interviews that some participants were embarrassed to share
certain personal traits with friends and concerned about
sharing their personal traits with strangers; they might have
realized it only seeing their data over time. More details of
the post-study interviews are given in Section 3.2.
Demographic differences. Though the study was not
designed to examine differences in sharing by characteristics
like occupational status or gender, we did find some differ-
ences across these characteristics and so present them as
preliminary findings that are suggestive of future study. As
shown in Table 5, independent sample t-tests revealed that
females shared traits (the combined score), weight and goals
with friends, significantly less than did male subjects. The
table shows only the difference in sharing with friends, but
there was a statistically significant difference in the extent
personal traits, weight and activity level were shared with
public and third parties as well [20].
As shown in Table 6, students shared their weight with
family more than employees shared with family. In contrast,
they shared their health goals less with the public, than
employed adults did with the public. Some of the employees
said they did not want to share weight information with
Table 6: Final normalized sharing scores - students
vs employees
Students Employees
grpscore(u, Family, Weight, 5) 0.90 0.50 †
grpscore(u, Public, Goals, 5) 0.48 0.83 †
† Sharing scores of students and employees are different,
p ≤ 0.1
Table 7: Final normalized sharing scores - students
vs retirees
Students Retirees
grpscore(u, Public, Traits, 5) 0.74 1.00 †
grpscore(u, Public, Weight, 5) 0.48 1.00 ∗
grpscore(u, Public, Goals, 5) 0.48 1.00 ∗
† Sharing scores of students and retirees are different, p ≤ 0.1
∗ Sharing scores of students and retirees are different,
p ≤ 0.05
their family to avoid discussion about weight management.
Students considered health goals to be sensitive and did not
want to share this information with the public, but surpris-
ingly, employees were more willing to share this information
with the public.
Students were much more concerned than retirees about
sharing their personal traits, weight and goals with the public,
as shown in Table 7. (Caveat: Recall that we had only
female retirees; given that females shared less than males
with friends in Table 5, we are not sure why female retirees
shared more with the public than students.) There are several
possible reasons for this difference in behavior: we speculate
that the retirees are not used to the technology or do not
want to bother their family and friends by sharing with them
information that the retirees feel will not be of interest; when
they do share this information with others, they are less
concerned about the information than students. We expect
students, on the hand, to be used to the technology and
used to sharing information electronically with others. We
speculate that they might have changed the default settings
either because they were curious about the different settings
or because they were really concerned about what they were
sharing with others. We expect students and employees to
have more reasons to be worried about their activities and
to hide it from their family and friends than retirees; either
because they were embarrassed about some information,
maybe their weight, or they wanted to hide some information,
like partying or sexual activity. Students and employees were
more engaged in the study than retirees. In Section 3.2, we
present anecdotal evidence of such behavior and concerns.
To summarize, we found that weight and health goals ap-
peared to be most sensitive among the information collected
during the study. Participants exhibited disparate and dy-
namic sharing behavior of this information. We found some
evidence that sharing behavior might vary with occupational
status and gender. After observing the participants’ sharing
behavior, we wanted to understand the reasons for their
sharing behavior, as discussed in the next section.
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3.2 Post-study Interviews
To give us insight into the reasons for participants’ sharing
behavior, we conducted post-study interviews. We discuss
the answers to the following questions: “Did you change
the sharing controls on the interface at any point? If so,
what influenced that decision? Did you change the sharing
controls for X? If so, why?”. For answers to other questions,
please refer to our technical report [20]. We recorded the
interviews. We coded the interviews manually and grouped
the statements into categories. We discuss below the reasons
for the participants’ sharing behavior.
Amount of information collected. Three participants
mentioned that they felt the information was not sensitive
because the device collected information only for five days.
One female student said that the reason she shared the
information with third parties was because “it was a study
and it wasn’t very long.”
Context of data collection. A few students were con-
cerned about sharing information that was collected by de-
vices while they were at parties or staying up late. A male
employee asked, “would [the device] be something you would
keep on during sexual activity or when you go to the bath-
room?”
Sensitivity of the data. One male student shared all
his information with others, but said that he might have had
concerns about sharing “if maybe I was someone who [was]
trying to exercise more and I exercised less.” A few female
students did not want to share their activity information
because they felt like they were being watched. One of them
said, “they can see every step I take, that was just a little
weird.”
Information utility. Some participants decided to share
their information with others depending on how they would
use the information. One female student said, “I think I
hid my weight from almost everybody, except for people who
actually needed it for medical purposes.” One employee, being
a researcher, was open to sharing her health information with
other researchers. Some participants considered the third
parties differently, based on their reason for requesting the
data. One female student said, “I was fine with sharing
things [with universities]; for some reason, they felt a lot
more legitimate, you know what they would be doing, studying.
It was random people that I didn’t know what they were doing
that I [did not want to share my information with].” One
male student said he would share information with everyone,
as long as it would not affect him in the future when he was
applying for insurance or jobs. He said, “I would be fine with
all of those, with the exception if that has an impact on the
ability to apply for insurance or something of that nature, in
which case I would start to worry.”
Anonymity. A few students felt their information would
not be linked to them (even though they were aware that
their email was being shared), so they were comfortable
sharing it with third parties. According to a female student,
“They don’t know who I am, they are just doing research.”
One male employee felt that his identity is linked more to his
name than his email. He said, “It’s my name, but I control
[my email]. I control what I get, I can change my email
address.”
Sharing partners. Most participants said they would
share information depending on who it was being shared
with. One female student said “If there was someone who
was a lot heavier than me, I probably would have given them
the 5 minute calories, because they might feel bad that I used
so many calories throughout the day. With friends who were
less active than me, I would have shared less.”
Partner involvement. One male student was happy to
share his activity information with others; he said when
you share activity information, “you feel like other people
are in this with you, it makes it easier to keep going”, and
he said encouraging feedback from his friends made him
feel good about sharing his information. A female student
shared her Fitbit information with third parties, because
according to her, “when I was wearing [the device] and getting
data requests all the time, it felt like what I was doing was
important” and she was disappointed that the requests were
fake, and to her, it meant that “no one actually cares about
your data and no one’s going to use it, it was all for nothing
kind of thing.” Some students did not want to share certain
information due to fear of being judged by others. A female
student said, “With my friends, I wasn’t sure whether to
share my height and weight, because sometimes especially if
I am sharing with my girlfriends, oh they are like you are
heavier than me, lighter than me.” Another female student
said, “I don’t mind articulating [my health information] in
person, but on a website, I feel it is more easily judged in the
wrong way that I can’t fully explain what is going on.”
Negative experiences. A female student was concerned
about sharing information with the government, because she
grew up in a country where “everything was monitored by
the government.” One female employee was sharing all her
information with the third parties during the study, until
she noticed that she started getting spam about weight loss,
which must have been coincidental.
Relationships. One elderly participant was not comfort-
able with sharing her activity information with her children.
She said, “I didn’t want them to have to encourage me to walk
more. They don’t need to know. We are very very close but
they don’t need to know how much I walk.” A male student
said, “I told [my mom] I would tell her of any results of any
significance, but I told her that I was hiding the data and I
wasn’t going to let her see it. Honestly, my friends didn’t
care about the data.”
Some students were more comfortable sharing their infor-
mation with family than their friends. One said, “If it was
someone I didn’t know I would share everything. Friends they
know you, but you are not close enough to share everything
with them. I shared everything with my mom.”
Some female students were more comfortable sharing per-
sonal information with their family and third parties than
with their friends. One student said “I might have left height
and weight with family, but friends don’t need to know that.
I shared it with companies and researchers, because I think it
is pertinent.”
Some students were more comfortable sharing their infor-
mation with family and friends than third parties. Two of
them said, “I didn’t share any information with the extra
researchers. I don’t know who they are and I have no affilia-
tion with them.” and “I don’t know [the requesters]. I don’t
think it is weird that they were asking for [the information],
but it was weird sharing with them. From teammates, hid
my weight and my health goals. From my mom, I didn’t hide
anything.”
Some students wanted to share their information with third
parties more than with people they knew, like their family
and friends. They said they wanted to share less information
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with family and friends: one participant said “because I know
them personally, whereas the third parties they seem, not
that personal... so I felt like more of a pressure to hide more
specific activity levels from [my family and friends].” Another
said “Because my parents are people who are big on exercise.
If I don’t do much exercise, they wouldn’t like that”, while a
third participant said “A bunch of researchers looking at the
data, I don’t care. But I might think twice about some people
I know, depending on who they are.” Another participant said
“People who don’t know me it would be fine. My age doesn’t
bother me, it would be mostly my weight. It all depends on
who gets it, what is the purpose. If it is somebody studying
what is the better way to do things.”
Some participants did not want to share information with
private companies. A male student said, “I’m against cor-
porations. I probably wouldn’t want any of them [to have
access to my information], except students.” A male em-
ployee said, “Oh yeah, I would share that info [with students].
With individuals, with family members or friends who are
interested and people doing research I have no problem. It is
just third-party companies [that I wouldn’t want to have the
data].”
One elderly retiree was not tech-savvy; her husband was
helping her manage her Fitbit account and he might have
had an influence on her sharing decisions.
Information types. We asked the participants whether
they would use a mobile device that collects personal health
information like their heart rate, breathing rate, pulse rate,
medication, diet and exercise, location, social interactions,
if it gave them similar sharing controls as the Fitbit in our
study. Most students considered medications to be most
sensitive. A male student said, “Just like bodily functions,
you can’t really use that against you, whereas medication you
are taking, that’s something like, there are some medications
people don’t want other people finding out that they are taking.”
Some of them were worried about sharing location and social
interactions. Students who were athletes were concerned
about sharing their vital signs and exercise information. One
female employee was open to sharing any information “as
long as [she] could control who saw what”.
4. DISCUSSION
The user study helped us identify the key factors that
influence privacy decisions regarding health and fitness infor-
mation collected using mHealth devices. The findings from
this study can help guide mHealth device and application
developers and privacy advocates to build flexible privacy
controls for mHealth devices, with sensible defaults and ex-
pressive controls for users to change the settings thereafter.
Our study revealed three interesting findings about people’s
privacy concerns regarding their sensed health information.
1. Demographic information shared less than sensed
information. The study revealed that participants were
less willing to share the demographic information we col-
lected than the activity information that was sensed by the
device. For example, initial sharing scores for weight and
health goals were less than the initial sharing scores for other
information types, including the sensed information. We
expect users to be concerned about sharing certain context
information, depending on how it might affect the value they
perceive in the information being shared. For example, a
user might share her location information when it is being
collected by her asthma sensor and shared with her mother,
but she might not want to share her location, when it is
collected as part of her activity information by her fitness
device.
2. Information shared more with strangers than
their own family and friends. We discovered that sharing
scores for friends were lower than scores for family, while
sharing scores for friends were lower than for third parties.
However, sharing scores for public were mostly the same or
less than friends. The post-study interviews revealed different
reasons for participants’ sharing behavior, including their
relationship with the sharing recipients. Participants were
more willing to share if they perceived benefits in sharing,
especially when it came to sharing with specific third parties,
as opposed to the public.
3. Dynamic sharing behavior. We confirmed that
privacy concerns are not static; mHealth device users may
change their sharing decisions over time.
Given these findings, we elaborate on two recommenda-
tions that will help guide the development of flexible privacy
controls that enable users to express their sharing preferences
easily.
Flexible controls need to support both fine- and
coarse-grained approaches to sharing. Throughout the
study we saw a wide diversity in sharing behavior. Some par-
ticipants used a very coarse-grained approach, while others
took the time to fine-tune their privacy settings. Sensible
default settings are required to support those users who never
change their sharing settings, either because they are busy,
lazy, not tech-savvy or want immediate benefits from the
system. The availability of granular controls encouraged
participants, who were averse to sharing everything, to share
some information, instead of hiding all information. Partici-
pants expressed disparate sharing preferences and exhibited
dynamic sharing behavior in our study, which implies that
default “one size fits all” settings are not enough.
We observed contradicting behavior among participants;
some participants shared more with their friends than with
family, while others shared more with their family than with
their friends. We also observed dynamic sharing behavior;
some participants changed the amount of information they
shared during the course of the study. Granular levels of
sharing and expressive controls, which we discuss next, can
help such users change their sharing setting easily to map
their preferences.
Reducing disconnect between information and gran-
ular controls. Users make their sharing decisions based on
what information they are sharing and who they are sharing
it with. Since sharing decisions are dynamic, the information
should be clearly presented and the controls flexible and easy
to use, to allow the participant to map their privacy prefer-
ences easily. Narrowing the gap between settings and what
is actually shared can help users change their behavior easily
to suit their sharing preferences. For example, in our study,
the website home page for every participant was divided into
different views, one view corresponding to one sharing recip-
ient, where the participant could decide what information
she wanted to share with that recipient. View for sharing
recipient “Mom” on the participant’s home page displayed
exactly what Mom would see as the participant’s health in-
formation. By combining the information and the granular
controls, the interface made it possible for the participant to
observe what Mom would see for different choices of sharing
settings and finally, choose the setting that best mapped her
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privacy preferences. We did not test the usability of the sys-
tem, so we cannot claim that the our design is the best way
to provide granular controls for sharing health information.
Designing an interface for an mHealth device and application
that collects a large amount of sensed, personal demographic
and context information and whose user has the option to
choose a large number of sharing recipients is an interesting
and challenging problem.
User studies, like ours, could benefit from a bigger sample
size, better population sampling and longer duration. Never-
theless, the study helped us understand people’s willingness
to share and their dynamic sharing behavior. We expect
these findings to hold broadly for other mHealth devices
and applications as well. A general privacy setting for all
mHealth devices is not possible, given the disparate sharing
behavior among users for even a single mHealth device. We
recommend seeking a general approach to health information
visualization: a flexible design that supports all mHealth de-
vices and allows users to also visualize how they are sharing
their health information with others.
5. RELATED WORK
Previous work has looked at people’s willingness to share
information with others. Previous work suggests that users
will change behavior when the context of information sharing
varies [18]. For example, studies of location tracking show
that at least some users will vary their willingness to share
depending on place and social context [2], time since the start
of information sharing [23], recipients [6], and their closeness
to the recipients [27]. Other studies of context show that
users are more likely to reveal information when the reward
from the exchange increases, but less likely to do so when
risk of identity theft increases [3]. Our findings confirm that
these results hold even for people’s willingness to share their
health information.
Willingness to share. Previous work has shown that
people make privacy decisions based on the information be-
ing shared and the person they are sharing it with. It has
been shown, through surveys and interviews, that users share
location information based on the sharing recipient, why the
recipients want the information, what would be useful to
them and whether the users want to disclose that informa-
tion with them; during the study, users received hypothetical
sharing requests from family and friends [6]. (Our findings
confirmed that people use the same sort of logic to make
privacy decisions with health information). An online survey
showed that participants do not understand the value of shar-
ing location information and their privacy decisions depend
on the sharing recipient [25]. The above two studies, however,
never gave the participants an opportunity to actually share
the information with real people, but just learned about their
sharing preferences through interviews and surveys. People
may not be aware of real privacy risks until they actually
share the information with others and receive feedback about
the sharing [5]; our study gave participants the opportunity
to actually share the information with real people. Our
study showed that people did have privacy concerns about
sharing certain information types, but they changed their
sharing settings during the course of the study. Our findings
confirmed results from previous work, which showed that
participants change their privacy policy decisions with time,
but participants in that study knew the information was not
being shared with real people [16]. The manner in which peo-
ple think they might share their information changes once
their information is actually shared with real people; the
findings from our study are more valid than previous work,
because our study participants actually shared information
with real people. Also the other studies were focused on
understanding privacy concerns while sharing other types of
information; we wanted to understand how sharing behavior
changes when it comes to health and fitness information.
Certain types of health information might be more sensitive
than other types of personal information, like location, so it
is important to study people’s privacy preferences regarding
health information.
Health information. Maitland et al. conducted inter-
views to understand the role of peers in weight management
and what information people are willing to disclose to their
peers [14]. We, too, wanted to understand users’ willing-
ness to share their fitness information, but we gave users an
opportunity to actually share their own fitness information
with family, friends and third parties. Olson et al. conducted
surveys with employees (median age of 35) to study people’s
willingness to share their personal information, including
pregnancy and health status, with others and they identified
similarities in what people wanted to share and who they
wanted to share it with [19]. Our work is different from
theirs in that we conducted a study with young students,
employees and retirees, where subjects collect information
about themselves and actually share that information with
real people (or in some cases, believe that their data is being
shared with actual people).
Sensors and mobile devices. Klasnja et al. study the
privacy concerns of patients using a fitness device by con-
ducting interviews [15]. We also study privacy concerns of
patients using a fitness device, but we focus on their willing-
ness to share the collected information. Raij et al. showed
that people are more aware of privacy risks once they receive
feedback about their shared health information, collected
using mobile sensors, and have a stake in the data, i.e., if
the shared health data is their own [22]. The study partici-
pants (in this case, students) filled out a survey after seeing
feedback about their information for 10-15 minutes. In our
study, we allow the participants to share the collected infor-
mation with real individuals chosen by them and study how
willing they are to share their activity and sleep information
with friends, family and third parties. To the best of our
knowledge, ours is the first study that explores users’ privacy
concerns by giving them the opportunity to actually share
the information collected about them using mHealth devices.
6. SUMMARY
To provide flexible and expressive privacy controls, it is
important to understand users’ willingness to share their per-
sonal health information collected using the device. Other
researchers used interviews and surveys to understand peo-
ple’s willingness to share; their results might not not reflect
real privacy concerns, since people remain unaware of real
privacy risks until they actually share the information with
others. We conducted a user study to understand how willing
users were to share their personal health information that
they collected using an mHealth device that they carried
with them at all times for five days. We recommend a flexible
design for sharing controls that narrows the gap between
controls and the information being shared, allowing patients
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to visualize how they are sharing their health information
with others.
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This section is taken from the position paper presented at
HealthSec 2011 [21], included herein for convenience to the
reader.
A.1 Methods
We conducted exploratory focus-group discussions to gain
a preliminary understanding about Patients’ privacy prefer-
ences. We have thus far had eight focus-group sessions with
3-7 participants each, who were college students (aged 19-30),
hospital outpatients (aged 80-85), or residents of a retirement
community (aged 65-100). Each focus group lasted for not
more than 90 minutes and all participants were paid for their
time. We chose these groups since we wanted to talk to
Patients who have some health experiences – some who have
been recently hospitalized and others who are monitored
continuously outside the hospital – and Patients who have
limited healthcare-related experiences. In the next phase,
we will conduct a user study to test individuals’ sharing
behavior.
Since mHealth devices are not yet common, the focus
group participants were presented with hypothetical scenarios
where mHealth devices were used. There were four scenarios,
in which an mHealth device was used to collect a Patient’s
personal information (measuring medication intake, diet and
exercise, location or social interactions); the collected data
was uploaded to a private website and then shared with
health providers, family or friends. The scenarios for the
young and the old differed in the age of the protagonists
and their medical condition, but were similar in every other
aspect like the information collected and the manner in which
it was collected, stored and shared.
We presented each scenario to the participants, after which
they were asked about the advantages and disadvantages of
using mHealth sensors in that scenario. They discussed their
concerns regarding the collection of the particular health
information in each scenario, and whether there were cer-
tain times and places when they did not want to collect
that information. The participants talked about why they
would want to share certain health information types with
health providers and family members. They also raised some
concerns regarding storage of the collected information.
We recorded the discussions. We coded the discussions
manually, and grouped the statements into categories.
A.2 Results
We summarize comments by type of participant.
Elderly and young participants said that
• They are more comfortable sharing health information
with doctors than with family members, since they trust
doctors to keep the information confidential.
• Some of them recognized that information might get com-
promised during transmission and on a private website.
• Third parties, like insurance companies, advertisers and
government agents, should not be allowed to access health
information without the Patient’s (or caregiver’s) consent
at the time of request.
• Health information can be shared with family members if
the Patient is incapable of making decisions (like young
children or elderly patients suffering from chronic illnesses).
• Most of them rated disclosure of diet and exercise infor-
mation as a greater privacy threat over that of medication
tracking, contradicting our expectations, and, all of them
were concerned more about the disclosure of location and
social interactions than that of medication and diet and
exercise. This confirmed our assumption that Patients’
privacy concerns may differ depending the information
type being monitored.
Elderly participants said that
• They may not always want to share information with
family members: a resident of the retirement home felt
she wanted to be independent from her family, while one
hospital outpatient felt some depressing news contained in
the health information might worry his family.
• Doctors might be overwhelmed with irrelevant data (one
participant).
Young participants said that
• They would be comfortable sharing their medical informa-
tion, like information about their medication, with their
doctor; privacy concerns arise, however, when devices cap-
ture other information about their lives.
• The devices can collect any information, as long as the
Patient gives consent and it affects only the Patient. Pri-
vacy concerns arise when an individual’s information gets
recorded by devices carried by others around her, without
her consent.
• Patients cannot understand complex privacy laws and they
give consent without knowing how it will affect them later.
• Privacy laws keep changing and it is unclear whether the
information collected now will still be protected by the
laws later.
A.3 Discussion
The main challenge to building privacy controls for mHealth
devices is the wide range of views held by different people. We
suggest the following features for a privacy-control interface
for an mHealth device:
• usable, so that Patients can understand what choices they
have and what choices to make,
• expressive, so that Patients can express their preferences
and decisions,
• intuitive, so that Patients can understand it quickly, with-
out any training, and
• transparent, so that Patients are aware of what information
is being collected, what is being shared, and with whom.
The interface could also provide recommended settings based
on the Patient’s background. From the focus groups, we
discovered that there were some concerns that were specific
to Patients who suffered from serious illnesses, distinct from
those who were diagnosed with less serious medical conditions.
Privacy concerns also vary with age and with the Patients’
relationship with their doctor and family members. We
expect that it is probable that Patients will have concerns
similar to their peers among the focus-group participants.
Since every Patient is different, we cannot set preferences
for them, but we can provide recommended settings to help
Patients make better sharing decisions about their health
information.
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The interface could provide sensible default settings for
the privacy controls, which could be based on the results
of the focus groups and with knowledge of the Patient’s
background and situation. Patients might select the default
privacy settings, either because they are not sure of what
settings to choose or because they need immediate benefits
and have no time to spend on choosing what to share with
whom.
The interface should provide access logs, so that the Patient
can decide whether more information is being shared than
required with a given data consumer, in which case she
might want to restrict sharing or she might decide that more
information needs to be shared.
The user interface can identify the sensitive content of the
information (using annotations or icons), highlight the possi-
ble privacy risks that may result from sharing information,
show changes occurring to the information, and reveal when
the data is accessed and used, and by whom, to help Patients
make sharing decisions.
The interface could provide hierarchical privacy controls –
controls that allow patients to specify preferences at higher
levels easily and drill down to specific details, if they want
to.
Building interfaces that can be used easily by all kinds of
Patients is a big challenge, especially since every Patient’s
needs and values are different. There must be a collaboration
with privacy and HCI researchers to work towards building
a usable privacy controls interface.
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